Abstract
Abstract
In Norway, the rationale for fleet adaptations has been subject to different interpretations and policies. While coastal settlement, a surplus fishing capacity and a negative resource rent were dominant adaptations until the end of the 1980's, market orientation and economic efficiency have gradually become the most central fisheries political goals. However, the rate of market-based transactions have affected the fleet structure, the distribution- and ownership of quota rights in a manner that challenge the legitimacy of the quota regime. Today, the ownership of the fish resources, a future resource tax and the legal status of being a fisherman are high on the political agenda.
In Norway, the rationale for fleet adaptations has been subject to different interpretations and policies. While coastal settlement, a surplus fishing capacity and a negative resource rent were dominant adaptations until the end of the 1980's, market orientation and economic efficiency have gradually become the most central fisheries political goals. However, the rate of market-based transactions have affected the fleet structure, the distribution- and ownership of quota rights in a manner that challenge the legitimacy of the quota regime. Today, the ownership of the fish resources, a future resource tax and the legal status of being a fisherman are high on the political agenda.
