Abstract
Since the introduction of quotas and licences as important management tools, Norway has insisted on an individual vessel quota regime (IVQ). The main argument has been to avoid market-based transactions of quotas and vessels and secure stability in regard to a diverse fleet structure and decentralized ownership of scarce cod resources. Thus, an individual transferable quota system (ITQ) with a high degree of transactions and the potential for a heavy concentration of quota ownership and fewer vessels has never been an alternative. However, since the late 80s, the trawler fleet has been trapped within a web of unprofitable overcapacity. Within the frame of a closed management regime and a path-dependent IVQ system, the quota regime has been forced towards a market-orientated system for transactions. In this article, we analyze the Norwegian IVQ system and discuss whether the aggregate effects of the IVQ regime are congruent with the models' profound ideals. (c) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
