

The logo for CINELDI, featuring the word "CINELDI" in a bold, dark blue sans-serif font. The letter "e" is replaced by a stylized green lightning bolt icon.

Centre for intelligent electricity distribution
- to empower the future Smart Grid



Norwegian Centre for
Environment-friendly
Energy Research

The background of the slide is a photograph of a green field with several solar panels in the foreground and several wind turbines in the distance under a blue sky with light clouds.

Designing grid tariffs and local electricity markets for peak demand reduction in distribution grids

CINELDI-webinar, November 30th, 2022

Sigurd Bjarghov

Welcome to my PhD defence!

- @Elbygget, Gløshaugen
- December 15th
- Zoom link will be available



CINELDI



Agenda



Drivers

- Need to reduce GHG emissions
- High need for more grid capacity, fast
- Higher share of distributed renewable generation



MARKEDSRAPPORT
Norsk solkraft 2022 – innenlands og eksport



SOL
ENERGI
KLYNGEN

Multiconsult




Need for a redesign of grid tariffs

Schreiber, M., Hochloff, P., 2013. Capacity-dependent tariffs and residential energy management for photovoltaic storage systems. In: IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. <https://doi.org/10.1109/PESMG.2013.6672200>.

Picciariello, A., Vergara, C., Reneses, J., Frías, P., Söder, L., 2015. Electricity distribution tariffs and distributed generation: quantifying cross-subsidies from consumers to prosumers. Util. Pol. 37, 23–33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2015.09.007>.

Hledik, R., 2014. Rediscovering residential demand charges. Electr. J. 27 (7), 82–96. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.07.003>.



Pérez Arriaga, I., Knittel, C., et al., 2016. Utility of the Future. An MIT Energy Initiative Response. URL energy.mit.edu/uof.

Eurelectric, 2021. The missing piece - Powering the energy transition with efficient network tariffs.

Brown, T., Faruqui, A., Grausz, L., 2015. Efficient tariff structures for distribution network services. Econ. Anal. Pol. 48, 139–149. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2015.11.010>.

ACER, 2021. ACER Report on Distribution Tariff Methodologies in Europe.

CEER, 2017. Electricity Distribution Network Tariffs CEER Guidelines of Good Practice.

Eurelectric, 2016. Network Tariffs - A EURELECTRIC position paper.

CEER, Distribution Systems Working Group, 2020. CEER Paper on Electricity Distribution Tariffs

Supporting the Energy Transition.


Hledik, R., Greenstein, G., 2016. The distributional impacts of residential demand charges. Electr. J. 29 (6), 33–41. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2016.07.002>.

Blank, L., Gegax, D., 2014. Residential winners and losers behind the energy versus customer charge debate. Electr. J. 27 (4), 31–39. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.04.001>.

E. Commission, 2019. Clean Energy for All Europeans Package. <https://bit.ly/3q2UuAn>.



Flexibility solutions



Sæle, Hanne; Sperstad, Iver Bakken; Høiem, Kristian Wang; Mathiesen, Vivi (2022): Feasibility study for utilising flexibility in operation and planning of the electricity distribution system. TechRxiv. Preprint. <https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.20593740.v1>



Annual grid tariff costs in Norway



 Varsel om inntektsrammer for 2022 ekskl. Statnett

19,3 mrd.

Investeringer og høyere rente gir større kapitalkostnader
Økte kraftpriser gir større nettapkostnader



 Varsel om inntektsrammer for 2022 for Statnett

9,9 mrd.

Investeringer og høyere rente gir større kapitalkostnader
Økning i nettaps- og systemansvarskostnader
Flaskehalsinntekter vil dempe tarifføkning

+

=

 Varsel om inntektsrammer for 2022 - samlet

29,2 mrd.

Anmodet nettselskaper med merinntekt til å utbetale denne i 2022
Selskaper med mindreinntekt kan søke om dispensasjon fra å styre saldo mot null
Ingen sammenheng mellom økning i inntektsrammer og ny nettleiemodell





The point tariff system

- One measurement point per customer
- Costs-scheme is static, regardless of system state
- Increasing share of behind-the-meter generation
 - New market participants in the power system



Local electricity markets



Research questions

- Research questions:

RQ1: How well do capacity-based grid tariffs and local electricity markets synergize in order to incentivize consumers to reduce peak demand?

RQ2: How well do capacity subscription tariffs perform in terms of cost reflectivity, cost recovery and fairness?

RQ3: Which grid tariffs designs are the most cost reflective and efficient at reducing peak demand at different grid levels?


RQ4: Aiming to reduce peak demand, is there a price signal conflict between electricity spot prices and grid tariffs?



Agenda



Grid tariff design criteria



Investigated eight grid tariffs

Energy-based

- Volumetric
- Time-of-use
- Critical peak pricing

Capacity-based


- Measured peak demand
- Capacity subscription
- Dynamic capacity subscription

Hybrid

- Standard, continuous version
- Norwegian version



Agenda




Local electricity markets

- Design aspects
 - Strategy: cooperative vs competitive
 - Market clearing: centralized vs decentralized
 - Trading mechanism: auction, market clearing, supply-demand
 - Price formation: uniform vs discriminatory
 - Location: static or dynamic




Challenges of local electricity markets

1. Distribution of generation
2. Distribution of demand response
3. Decentralization of markets
4. Legal boundaries
5. Social implications




Design aspects of local electricity markets

- Market clearing topology




Design aspects of local electricity markets

- Market clearing topology
- Price formation



a) Centralized market clearing with uniform pricing




b) Decentralized P2P market clearing with discriminatory pricing




Design aspects of local electricity markets

- Market clearing topology
- Price formation
- Strategy




Design aspects of local electricity markets

- Market clearing topology
- Price formation
- Strategy
- Pilot projects



Design aspects of local electricity markets

- Market clearing topology
- Price formation
- Strategy
- Pilot project challenges
- Pilot project modelling



Agenda



Main findings


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Main findings


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


Main findings

Local electricity markets & grid consideration

Capacity subscription & local electricity markets

Grid tariff design for peak demand reduction




Main findings


Local electricity markets & grid consideration

Capacity subscription & local electricity markets

Grid tariff design for peak demand reduction



Part 1 – Local electricity markets



Part 1 – main findings

- Wanted to consider how local electricity markets could solve grid related challenges
- Merge the gap between tariffs, policy and local electricity markets
- **RQ1:** How well do capacity-based grid tariffs and local electricity markets synergize in order to incentivize consumers to reduce peak demand?



TABLE 6. Literature on market challenges.

Paper	Centralized market clearing	Decentralized market clearing	Balancing products	Demand response
[93]	x			
[70]		x		
[94]		x		
[95]		x		
[96]	x	x		x
[97]	x			
[98]	x		x	
[62]	x			x
[99]		x		
[100]	x			
[101]	x			
[102]		x		
[103]	x		x	x
[104]	x			
[105]		x		x
[48]	x			
[107]	x			
[108]		x		
[109]	x		x	x
[110]	x			x
[111]	x		x	x
[112]	x	x	x	x
[113]		x		x
[114]	x			x
[115]	x			x
[116]	x			x
[117]	x			x
[118]	x			x
[119]	x			x
[120]	x			x
[121]	x			x
[122]	x			x
[123]	x		x	x
[124]		x		
[125]	x			x
[81]	x	x		x
[128]		x	x	
[129]		x		
[131]		x		x
[132]		x		
[118]			x	
[134]	x			
[135]	x			
[136]	x			x
[137]		x		x
[138]	x		x	x
[139]	x			x
[140]	x			x
[141]	x			x
[142]	x			
[143]		x		
[144]	x			x
[145]	x			
[146]	x	x		x
[147]		x		

TABLE 5. Literature on grid related challenges.


Paper	AC PF	DC PF	Congestions	Voltages	Tariffs	Policy
[93]	x		x	x		
[70]					x	x
[94]	x		x	x		
[95]	x		x	x		
[96]	x		x	x	x	
[97]	x		x	x		
[98]	x		x	x	x	
[62]		x	x	x		
[102]		x	x	x		x
[105]			x			x
[107]	x		x	x		
[108]		x	x			
[109]		x	x			
[110]	x		x			
[112]		x	x			
[115]			x		x	x
[116]	x		x	x		
[117]	x		x	x		
[119]		x	x		x	
[120]			x		x	
[121]			x		x	x
[122]			x		x	x
[81]		x	x			
[128]	x			x		
[129]	x		x	x		
[133]	x			x		
[134]	x		x	x		
[137]			x			
[138]	x		x	x		
[139]	x		x	x		
[140]			x			
[141]	x		x	x		
[142]	x		x	x		
[86]	x	x	x	x		
[143]		x	x			
[144]	x		x	x		
[145]	x		x	x		
[146]	x		x	x		
[147]	x		x	x		

Main findings

Local electricity markets & grid consideration


Capacity subscription & local electricity markets

Grid tariff design for peak demand reduction




Part 2 – Synergy of capacity subscription tariffs and local electricity markets

- Capacity subscriptions require ex-ante choices
- Moves risk decision from DSO to consumer
- Opens for a number of challenges





Capacity subscription

- Assess cost recovery, fairness and cost reflectivity
- Static and dynamic tariff
- Developed a two-stage stochastic program to find optimal subscription level under uncertainty





Static and dynamic capacity subscription




Part 2 – main findings

- Finding optimal subscription level is “easy”
- Cost recovery is stable for static capacity subscription tariffs
- Cost recovery is unstable for dynamic capacity subscription tariffs
- Capacity subscriptions are more cost reflective, and hence more fair (economically speaking)




Part 2 – capacity subscription and local electricity markets

- Local electricity markets facilitate coordination between customers by accounting for the coincidence factor
- Capacity subscription tariffs and local electricity markets achieve similar results as centralized control
 - Fits well with point tariff system



Part 2 – capacity subscription and local electricity markets

- Local electricity markets facilitate coordination between customers by accounting for the coincidence factor
- Capacity subscription tariffs and local electricity markets achieve similar results as centralized control
 - Fits well with point tariff system
- Essentially creates a local market for renting capacity





Main findings

Local electricity markets & grid consideration


Capacity subscription & local electricity markets

Grid tariff design for peak demand reduction



Part 3 – Grid tariff design for peak demand reduction

- Goal: Compare grid tariff designs and their potential to reduce peak demand at different grid levels
- Applied to a large, real case study
- Describe grid tariff design parameters on a more fundamental level



Research questions and methodology

- Consumer optimization, minimizing individual consumer costs based on:
 - Cost of grid tariffs
 - Flexibility constraints
 - Discomfort costs of using flexibility
 - (Cost of electricity)
- Assumptions
 - All consumers are subject to the same tariff
 - All consumers are flexible (but averagely)

RQ3: Which grid tariffs designs are the most cost reflective and efficient at reducing peak demand at different grid levels?

RQ4: Aiming to reduce peak demand, is there a price signal conflict between electricity spot prices and grid tariffs?



Comparison of six grid tariff designs



- Time-of-use
- Critical peak pricing
- Real-time pricing
- Measured peak demand
- Capacity subscription
- Hybrid (Time-of-use + measured peak demand)

Tariff design parameters	Energy-based tariffs			Capacity-based tariffs		Hybrid
	ToU	Crit. peak	Real-time	Cap. sub.	Meas. peak	
Decisive cost component	Energy			Capacity		Both
Peak basis	Grid			Individual		Both
Peak rate period setting	Ex-ante			Ex-post		Both





Energy-based: Time-of-use

- Two cost levels
 - 06-22, high energy term
 - 22-06, small energy term
- Only active during
 - Weekdays
 - November-March





Energy-based: Critical peak pricing

- Two cost levels
 - 06-22, high energy term
 - 22-06, small energy term
- Only active during the 20 days with the highest peak loads in NO1





Energy-based: Real-time pricing

- Energy term increases linearly when the demand in NO1 is >80% of the peak demand
- Fixed when >90% of the peak demand





Capacity-based: Measured peak demand

- Energy term increases linearly when the demand in NO1 is >80% of the peak demand
- Fixed when >90% of the peak demand





Capacity-based: Capacity subscription

- Optimal subscribed capacity based on individual load data
- Consumption above the subscription level is subject to an excess energy term




Hybrid: Time-of-use + meas. peak.

- Mix of time-of-use and measured peak demand
- Close to the current Norwegian model
 - (but without the steps!)





Case study

- 3608 consumers
- Nov 2020 – Oct 2021
 - Highest peak demand in Norway (ever!)
- Base case assumes that..
 - All consumers subject to same tariff and all are flexible
 - Load reduction
- Sensitivities on...
 - Load reduction versus load shifting
 - Size of flexible demand (power & energy)
 - Grid tariff design parameters




Consumer flexibility

- All consumers have flexibility (but adjusted to an average)
- Assumptions:
 - 2.5 % of the daily consumption is flexible
 - 25 % of hourly consumption is flexible





Case study

- Consumers are aggregated on four different levels
 - Consumer level (individual)
 - Substation level (LV)
 - Transformer level (MV)
 - NO1 (HV)




Case study

- Demand data at this transformer appear to be extrapolatable to NO1
- We therefore assume that these results can be transferred to NO1



Main results – base case




Tariff design parameters	Energy-based tariffs			Capacity-based tariffs		Hybrid
	ToU	Crit. peak	Real-time	Cap. sub.	Meas. peak	
Decisive cost component	Energy			Capacity		Both
Peak basis	Grid			Individual		Both
Peak rate period setting	Ex-ante			Ex-post		Both



Main results – efficiency parameters



- Energy-based and hybrid tariffs perform the best peak demand reduction
- Critical peak pricing is the most efficient (most precise)
- All tariffs are imprecise and trigger ineffective flexibility



	Theor. max	ToU	Crit. peak	Real-time	Meas. peak	Cap. sub.	Hybrid
Change in peak demand	-6.9 %	-3.5 %	-3.5 %	-4.0 %	-1.0 %	-2.8 %	-3.6 %
Used flexibility	2.3 %	37.9 %	9.0 %	20.9 %	13.6 %	36.2 %	45.7 %
Effective flexibility	100.0 %	0.7 %	3.1 %	1.9 %	0.2 %	0.4 %	0.7 %




Sensitivity – reduction versus shifting




Sensitivity – level of daily flexible demand

Substation




Transformer




Sensitivity – level of hourly flexible demand

Substation





Transformer



Measured peak demand: steps and peak period

- Adding steps reduces peak load reduction capability
 - The hybrid tariff is now essentially a time-of-use tariff
- Short peak period times increase peak demand reduction, but requires more response





What happens when the spot price increases?



- **RQ4:** Aiming to reduce peak demand, is there a price signal conflict between electricity spot prices and grid tariffs?



Spot prices correlate with peak demand on daily basis, but not on seasonal basis



Spot prices conflict with the price signal from grid tariffs



Agenda



Take-aways & conclusions

- Research questions:

RQ1: How well do capacity-based grid tariffs and local electricity markets synergize in order to incentivize consumers to reduce peak demand?

Very well! Deals with coincidence factors, reduces peak demand and avoids cross-subsidies.

RQ2: How well do capacity subscription tariffs perform in terms of cost reflectivity, cost recovery and fairness?

Much better than existing tariffs, but have their own drawbacks.

RQ3: Which grid tariffs designs are the most cost reflective and efficient at reducing peak demand at different grid levels?

Hybrid and energy-based tariffs are more efficient on higher grid levels, capacity-based tariffs on lower grid levels.

RQ4: Aiming to reduce peak demand, is there a price signal conflict between electricity spot prices and grid tariffs?

Yes! Problematic for automatic demand response.



Future work

- Consider dynamic subscription tariffs, especially for large consumers
 - Risk aspects
 - Cost reflectivity
- Local electricity markets and grid implications – grid should not be forgotten
- Consider more extensive cost redistribution and fairness aspects when designing grid tariffs
 - Determine cross-subsidies, industry $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ consumers, prosumers $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ consumers



CINELDI

Centre for intelligent electricity distribution
- to empower the future Smart Grid

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Digital Economy (DigEco)




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Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

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