Abstract
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22/7 2011, numerous public reports have
been issued in order to describe and explain the events and make recommendations to improve the ability of
the Norwegian society to withstand and manage future terrorist acts. The Official Norwegian Report (NOU)
written by the investigating commission chose to emphasise that “(…) lessons learned are to a greater extent
applicable to leadership, interaction, culture and attitudes, than to a lack of resources, a need for new legislation,
organization or important value choices.” (p.16) Several evaluation reports, issued later on, claim that many of
the problems and challenges addressed by the NOU were still present, and that learning had failed.
In this paper we address the task performance of the police during the terror attack, based on the representation
of the course of events given in The Official Norwegian Report (NOU). Our attention is directed towards the
interaction between different roles in the emergency organization in order to understandwhy available information
was not put to use in the form of adequate actions, and why some unfortunate decisions were made. Based on
analyses of reports and interviews with representatives from the police sector, we argue that a marginalization of
the operational and strategic level of the emergency organization, and the inadequate ability of knowledge-based
performance contributed to an ineffective police response in order to track and capture the perpetrator, and
eventually hinder the tragedy at Utøya.We found that the limited extent of knowledge-based performance seems
to stem from a predominately skill-based orientation within the police, promoted by established conventions of
what “proper police work” is about.
been issued in order to describe and explain the events and make recommendations to improve the ability of
the Norwegian society to withstand and manage future terrorist acts. The Official Norwegian Report (NOU)
written by the investigating commission chose to emphasise that “(…) lessons learned are to a greater extent
applicable to leadership, interaction, culture and attitudes, than to a lack of resources, a need for new legislation,
organization or important value choices.” (p.16) Several evaluation reports, issued later on, claim that many of
the problems and challenges addressed by the NOU were still present, and that learning had failed.
In this paper we address the task performance of the police during the terror attack, based on the representation
of the course of events given in The Official Norwegian Report (NOU). Our attention is directed towards the
interaction between different roles in the emergency organization in order to understandwhy available information
was not put to use in the form of adequate actions, and why some unfortunate decisions were made. Based on
analyses of reports and interviews with representatives from the police sector, we argue that a marginalization of
the operational and strategic level of the emergency organization, and the inadequate ability of knowledge-based
performance contributed to an ineffective police response in order to track and capture the perpetrator, and
eventually hinder the tragedy at Utøya.We found that the limited extent of knowledge-based performance seems
to stem from a predominately skill-based orientation within the police, promoted by established conventions of
what “proper police work” is about.
